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Moral Preemption Part II: The Natural
Law and Conscience.-Based Claims
in Relation to Legitimate
State Expectations
By JOSEPH J. FARRAHER, S.J.*
THE first amendment to the Constitution of the United States
guarantees that "Congress shall make no law abridging the free-
dom of speech or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Does this
include a right to call attention to one's cause by deliberate dis-
obedience to civil laws? Some demonstrators may argue that such a
right is included in the First Amendment; others appeal rather to a
higher law, a moral or religious law The latter is the subject of this
article.
The appeal of demonstrators to a "higher law" or to conscience is
not, strictly speaking, an appeal to preemption of a given area of
conduct by a higher law, but rather an appeal to the prevalence of a
higher law m a case of conflict of law Strict preemption of an area
of conduct by a religious law might be argued under the concept of
the separation of church and state: that in certain areas where the
church claims competence, the state should not legislate at all. This
has been discussed widely, especially in past centuries.' However, even
those who held for such preemption limited their claim to specific
areas and admitted that there were areas which were "mixed"--
generally, areas of morality which also affected public order, such as
murder, theft, and such.
Preemption in a broader sense may be taken to mean that in cases
of conflict of laws, the higher law should prevail. It is in this sense
that modem demonstrators appeal to a law higher than any merely
human law, in claiming a right to disobey certain civil laws. The kinds
- A.B., 1940, M.A., 1941, Gonzaga University; S.T.L. 1948, Alma College; S.T.D.,
1952, Gregorian Umversity, Rome. Professor of Moral Theology, Alma College, Los Gatos,
Califorma, 1951-present. President, Alma College.
I It has been most recently discussed m the Second Vatican Council's Declaration
on Religious Freedom, found m the National Catholic Reporter, Dec. 15, 1965, p. 6;
[hereinafter cited as Declaration on Religious Freedom]; The Constitution on the Church
tn the Modern World, m THE DocumErs oF VATicAN II 14 (Abbott ed. 1966).
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of demonstrations which involve such a clann may be classified in
two major compartments: those claiming that their disobedience is
against an unjust law, and those claiming a right to disobey even just
laws in order to call attention to a just cause.
The 'Right to Disobey Unjust Laws
For those who believe in God as the First Cause and Creator of
all things, all authority and all rights must in some way derive from
God. For, if God is truly the ultimate cause of the existence of all
things, He has radical or direct dominion over all things. Men, as
creatures of God, can have dominion over certain things only as com-
municated to them by the Creator. These principles were acknowl-
edged by the Founding Fathers of our country and expressly stated
in the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable rights
To treat this matter fully would require far more space than any
article could provide. A mere sketch or outline of the theology of
authority will have to suffice. The theology is that of Roman Ca-
tholicism,2 but its basic elements are common to Christian, Jewish
and Islamic theologies,3 and to a lesser degree, all theistic religions
with the exception of some pantheistic and deistic groups.
God is the all-perfect, self-sufficient First Cause and Creator of all
other things. He has made man for everlasting happiness with Himself
after this terrestrial life; but He has also made man with free will so
that man may, in some sense, earn that happiness and so appreciate
it more. This freedom implies that man may also fail to achieve his
final destiny To earn it, he must live this life in a way laid out for
him by God. He must acknowledge his creaturehood by obeying the
will of his Creator. This way is made known to man partly by the way
in which God has created nature-the so-called natural law4-- and
2 The bal principles are contained m various papal encyclicals, e.g., Leo XIII,
Civil Government (Diuturnum), m 1 SocIAL WspRIcs 47 (Husslem ed. 1940);
Leo XIII, Christian Constitution of States (Immortale Dei), id. at 63; Pius XI, Restoring
Christian Social Order (Quadragestmo Anno), m 2 Socm_. WEi.s5pBiNs 174 (Husslem
ed. 1942); John XXIII, Peace on Earth (Pacem in Terns), 9 THE PoPE SPEAxs 13
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Pacem in Terns]. See generally Declaration on Religious
Freedom; CoNL, THE CAir'OLIC As Cmrzs (1963); Mummay, WE HoLD THESE
TRuTrHs (1960); Storm, Socn-rY AND SAN= (1953).
3 See A Statement by the House of Bishops to the Church on Christian Obedience,
The Episcopalian, Dec. 1964, p. 31; BENN=T, CinsrTLANs Am THE STATE (1958);
KAHN, IsLAm-ITS MEAnING FoR MoDERN MAN (1962); Kum, SomE PaNciPius oF
MORAL THEOLOGY (1920); MoRTnma,% THE ELmvm-NS or MORAL THEOLOGY (1947).
4 See RoMinN, THE NATuRA. LAw (1947); Declaration on Religious Freedom § 14.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
partly by the revelation of God through inspiration of those men
whom we know as the human authors of the Bible. For Catholics,
and to a lesser degree for other Christians, this revelation is interpreted
and clarified by the teaching authority which God established through
Christ in His Church. 5
The Creator endows men with certain rights-basically the right
to whatever is necessary to lead a normal human life: an absolute right
to what is absolutely necessary to lead a human life; a relative right
to those things without which it would be very difficult but not abso-
lutely npossible to lead a human life.
God has created man as a social being, able to commumcate and
to cooperate with other men. To regulate the dealings of men with one
another, some authority or some form of government is necessary For
primitive man, a patriarchal or tribal form was sufficient. As civiliza-
tion developed and population increased and found new ways of easier
commuication and contact, the need for more complicated forms of
government grew This necessity for a governing authority for social
groupings of men is a natural consequence of the way that God made
man, and therefore the authority to govern has its origin in God. Ac-
cording to the Scriptures," all true civil authority is from God, even
though the form of government may be arrived at by different means.
This civil authority is limited to the purposes for which it exists;
namely, to promote the material and physical welfare of its citizens.
This will include both positive and negative aspects: promoting the
well-being of its citizens, especially those most in need,r and working
against whatever would violate or endanger the rights of any of its
citizens.8 In achieving these ains, much of civil law will overlap with
divine law- prohibitions of murder, robbery, attack, and such. Strictly
private matters of morality do not come under the competence of civil
authority except as they may affect the rights of other persons or the
common good.9
In this theistic concept of civil authority, it is evident that since
all civil authority derives from God, the state has no authority to make
5 Reaffrmed for Catholics m the recent Vatican Council's The Dogmatic Constitu-
tion on the Church (De Eccleasa), 10 THE PoPE, SPEAKxS 359 (1965).6 Romans 13:1-7; 1 Peter 2:13-17. See generally Pacem m Terris § 46; Declaration
on Religious Freedom § 11.
7 FAritrwip, CATHOLIC TEAcHING ON RACE RELATiONS 13 (1964); Pacem in Terris
§ 56.
8 Pacem in Terns § 60; Declaration on Religious Freedom § 6.
9 Pacem in Terris § 48. See also ST. JOHN-STEVAs, LiFE, DEIT AND THE LAw
(1961); Declaration On Religious Freedom § 3.
March, 1966] MORAL PREEMPTION
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
laws which contradict divine law '0 Hence any law which contradicts
divine law is null and void and need not be obeyed by the citizens;
in fact if it commands an act which is clearly against God's law, or
prohibits something clearly required by God's law, it should be
disobeyed."
The obvious difficulty is to determine what is God's law In a de
facto pluralistic society, there will not be agreement on how to deter-
mine what is the law of God. It is hardly within the state's competence
to make this determination. Still the state should recognize this Ihm-
tation on its own authority and so should respect any reasonable claim
to exemption from its law on the ground that the law contravenes
God's law But what constitutes a reasonable claim?
Claims to a right to act contrary to the laws of a country are
usually attributed to "conscience." But what is this conscience to which
appeal is so often made? The popular idea of conscience is of a strong
interior feeling or inner "voice" which approves or disapproves one's
actions. To Catholic theologians, moral conscience is an exercise of
a man's judgment as to the morality of an action which he is con-
templatmg performing or which he has already performed. To those
theologians who would consider conscience in the more popular
sense of the word, conscience is still to be trained or corrected to
agree with the law of God as known by revelation and nature and
the teaching of the Church. 12 Conscience can therefore be either cor-
rect or erroneous. A man is justified in following his conscience even
when it is erroneous, if he has no suspicion that it is incorrect. But if
he even suspects that it is incorrect, he is obliged to correct it as best
he can before acting. Theologians, then, accept some extrinsic norms
for judging whether certain actions are morally obligatory or morally
permitted or morally forbidden. When it comes to particular actions,
not all theologians are agreed among themselves, even within the same
religious groups, but especially among the various faiths. Witness the
present confusion on the question of contraceptive pills, therapeutic
abortions, use of nuclear weapons even in a war of defense, and so on.
For Roman Catholics, the authoritative teaching of the Pope or of all
the bishops of the church, whether gathered in an ecumenical council
ioPacem m Terns § 51; Acts 5:29; Daniel 3:13-18. See also McCormick, When
Laws Should be Broken, Ave Maria, Nov. 30, 1963, pp. 11-15; Declaration On Religwus
Freedom § 9.
11 There is a rebuttable presumption in favor of the legitimacy of a de facto civil
power, the justice of the laws of a legitimate authority (including commands by military
authorities), a clear law over a vague or obscure one.
12 KiaK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 176; MoRTnw, op. cit. supra note 2, at 75.
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or not, is decisive. '3 Most other faiths do not have such a decisive norm,
and so confusion continues in even more questions among them than
among Catholics.
What should be the attitude of the state when a citizen appeals
to his conscience m refusing to obey a particular law? Since the state
cannot take upon itself to decide which religion is right, nor which
faction in a given religion is right, it should respect any reasonable
claim of conscience. Nevertheless the state has the right to demand
some evidence beyond the mere assertion of conflict with conscience
when such assertion is in favor of the asserter and against existing laws
of the state. Admittedly there can and will be difficulties in drawing
fine lines as to what constitutes sufficient evidence. Certainly member-
ship m a large, well-organized religion which publicly and officially
teaches a doctrine at variance with the law in question should be sufi-
cient evidence. This is accepted in this country with respect to bearing
arms in combat, or taking an oath, or for Jehovah's Witnesses with
regard to saluting the flag.
If the dissenter is not a member of such a religion but claims that
he agrees with such teaching, the state would be justified m demanding
some evidence that the man accepted this teaching at a time when it
was not to hIs immediate self-interest or concern so to do.
But what of an individual person who claims conscientious objec-
tion but cannot support his clai with any recognized public teaching
of any sizeable respectable group? Theologically speaking, if he is
convinced that a particular law demands of him an action that is
against the law of God, he must refuse that act. But the state cannot
know a man's internal state of conscience. It can only judge by ex-
ternally known matters. So, if no publicly known teaching of any kind
supports the man's claim, the state need not accede to his claim.
Since the state has the right and obligation to defend its citizens
against enemies foreign and domestic, it would seem to have the
right to reject as a basis for conscientious objection against its laws,
the teaching of any group or ideology which is actively and openly
opposed to the basis principles on which the existing form of govern-
ment is established; e.g., the Communist Party, anarchists, totalitarians
of any land.
As for smaller groups, less than an orgamzed religion but not op-
posed to our form of government as such, it might be an ideal policy
for the government to exempt anyone claiming conscientious objec-
is Vatican Council J1, The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, op cit. supra
note 5, § 25.
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tion from required performance of an act winch would be against his
conscience, especially if an equivalent service can be substituted for
the required act, as is done in substituting medical corps work for
combat duty, and as might be done for conscientious objectors against
certain uses of their tax money 14
Of peculiar interest in this respect is the appeal to conscience by an
avowed atheist. In what sense can his appeal be based on the pre-
cedence of a higher law? He does not acknowledge any divine law
since he rejects the existence of a personal divinity In acceding to
claims of conscientious objection not based on a claimed duty to a
personal deity, the Supreme Court seemed to recognize that even an
atheist might consider the demands of human nature as higher than
those of civil law 15 Perhaps theologians might consider rather that
even an atheist has an innate recognition of the law of nature as of a
higher power, even though he refuses to recognize this higher power as
a personal divinity
As was intimated above, the dictates of conscience may be
obligatory, prohibitive, or merely permissive."6 The mere fact that
one's conscience tells him that a given act is morally all right (perns-
sive conscience), does not necessarily give him a right to do that act.
In fact, the state may reasonably restrain any such act in public if it
is offensive to most or many others. The fact that someone judges that
it is not morally wrong to utter obscene language in public does not
ipso facto give him a right to utter such language in public. If the law
of God demanded such language of him, then he might reasonably
claim such a right; but he would have a hard time showing any rea-
sonable support for such a claim.
The above theories about allegedly unjust laws would seem to apply
analogously to the unjust exercise of jurisdiction under an otherwise
just law For example, the law guarantees the right to peaceable
assembly But local laws also rightly limit the exercise of this right
when the assembly might interfere with ordinary traffic of other
people, demanding advance notice and the obtaining of a permit.
If proper application is made for a permit and the application is
unjustly turned down, then the petitioner is in the same position as
against an unjust law An analogous situation occurred in the case of
1 4 BENNETT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 113.
15 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
I6 Some writers and speakers seem to ignore the third possibility when they speak
only of judgment in conscience that an act is morally either right or wrong. But what
is morally right is certainly not always obligatory.
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the Selma-to-Montgomery march where the Governor on his own
motion prohibited the march.17
The same theories also apply to such matters of authority as court
sentences and military commands. In the latter, there is not so much
the question of a right to disobey an unjust command, as of an
obligation to disobey a command to do something morally wrong, such
as shooting innocent civilian hostages during a war, or mdiscrimiately
destroying large civilian populations. The chief moral responsibility
is on the one giving the commands. For the subject, as with laws,
presumption favors the justice of a command; but the presumption
yields to contrary evidence. And so the subject is morally obliged to
disobey a command to do anything which is evidently immoral. The
fact that he would be acting under orders would not justify his going
against the laws of God. "We must obey God rather than men.""8
The Right to Disobey Just Laws
The second form of civil disobedience concerns those who disobey
civil laws without any clann that the laws are unjust, but merely as
a means of attracting attention to a cause which is judged just. It
should be safe to presume that all religious persons would disapprove
the deliberate causing of physical damage to the persons or property
of other human beings, and so omit any discussion of this type of ac-
tion. The only land of action in present demonstrations which seems
to be of this type involves one or more of the following: the deliberate
obstruction of traffic (such as the Chicago demonstrations of the past
year); the physical prevention of carrying on of business (like the
sit-ins, lie-ins and shop-ms of a year or so ago); or the deliberate
violation of ordinances concerning assemblies and parades without
making any attempt at obtaining the required permit.
Perhaps this section should be prefaced with an outline of Catholic
and other Christian theology on the moral obligation of citizens to
obey the laws of their country All believers in the Gospel of Jesus
1 7 The federal district court held that the proclamation of the Governor banning
any march, regardless of how conducted, was unreasonable. The court approved the plan
submitted by the marchers and enjoined the State officials from interfering with the
march. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
i8 Acts 5:29; See Address by Pius XII, "International Penal Law," Sixth Interna-
tional Congress of Penal Law, Oct. 3, 1953, in 52 CATHOLIC MiND 107, 114 (1954)"
"The moral principle in such cases is absolutely dear: no higher authority can validly
command an immoral act; there exists no right, no obligation, no pernmssion to accom-
plish an act, evil in itself, even if it is ordered, and even if the refusal to do the action
involves the worst personal damages."
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Christ as given in the New Testament accept the clear teaching
contained therein that the state, once legitimately formed, has its
authority from God and so can oblige its citizens in conscience to what-
ever is judged necessary for the common good.19 Catholic theologians
pretty well agree that not everything labeled civil law binds in con-
science; for example, most agree that the less serious laws do not bind
directly in conscience to perform or omit the acts commanded or
enjoined. Catholic theologians do not agree on why this is so, some
holding that it is not the intention of modem legislators to multiply
conscience obligations of .their fellow citizens and so legislate for the
most part with the hope that the threat of civil penalties like fines and
imprisonment will suffice to ensure compliance with the law However
all theologians also agree that a citizen has an obligation in conscience
to do his fair part for the common good, and that he will often sin in
disobeying civil laws either because he shirks his ordinary duty as a
citizen or because he violates the rights of others. Thus, most Catholic
theologians would hold that traffic speed laws do not of themselves
bind in conscience, but that many violations of speed laws involve
sin by causing unnecessary risk to the life and property of the driver
and others.20
In these matters of demonstrations, then, Catholics would not easily
see sin in the mere disobedience of the law itself, but would see the
possibility of sm in causing unnecessary mental anguish or suffering
or deliberate loss of business to others. Even unnecessary blocking of
traffic causes, besides possible losses in business, mconvemence and
feelings of anguish to those blocked. It is true that these inconvemences
and losses are not violations of inalienable or absolute rights, but they
can be violations of relative rights of others and hence must be
justified by a necessity of a higher order.
However, even in cases in which by Catholic theology no sm would
be involved, the question can still be posed: Has a person a Tight to
disobey a law in order to call attention to some injustice not contained
in the law to be disobeyed? Or, to put the question from the viewpoint
19 Matthew 22:21; Romans 13:1-7; 1 Peter 2:13-17; Pacem rn Ters § 46. It would
exceed the scope of this article to consider the question of how civil authority is legit-
inately established. The religious aspect of the question is treated to some extent in
Leo XIII, Civil Government and Christian Constitution of States, op. cit. supra note 2;
Pius XI, Position of the Church in Germany (Mit Brennender Sorge), in 2 SocIA. WEL.L-
sPnes 316 (Husslem ed. 1942); Pius XI, Atheistic Communism (Diznt Redemptorts),
in 2 SocIAL WEU-sPImiGs 339 (Husslem ed. 1942). Cf. Pacem in Terris § 61. "Thus any
government which refused to recognize human rights or acted in violation of them,
would not only fail in its duty; its decrees would be wholly lacking in binding force."20 Farraher, Notes on Moral Theology, 24 THEOLOGICAL S=Ivms 53, 69 (1963).
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of the state: has the state a right to enforce a just law when the
violation is done in support of a just cause?
We have two types of case especially in mind in this section. The
first is one in which the carrying on of business is deliberately
obstructed physically, by sit-in, lie-m, shop-in, stand-m, and this not
in protest against not being given service by the business, but in
protest about some other alleged injustice by the business, such as
discrimination m hiring practices. The second type will be that of
causing disturbance to the general public in order to attract attention
to a cause, such as by lying down in the middle of a busy thoroughfare.
The arguments used by the defenders of such procedures are
somewhat similar. Citizens have a right to seek redress of evils; there-
fore they have the right to the means which are necessary to achieve
the redress; but ordinary legal channels are too slow and clumsy to
obtain redress for those now suffering injustices; therefore they have
the right to use means which are contrary to the law The effectiveness
of some such illegal activities has been offered as proof.
Theologians would agree that a man who has the right to a certain
end, has the right to the necessary means to that end. It does not follow
that he has the right to any means which will achieve the end. And
the success of the Selma-to-Montgomery march would seem to prove
that legal means can also be effective in achieving very difficult ends,
including quick action from Congress on a civil rights bill, even if the
ordinary channels of court action would not achieve such ends.
Others who support such measures try to justify them on the
grounds that the demonstrations are a form of defense against injustice.
Just as a man has the right to protect himself against injustice, so his
neighbors may help him in tis defense. If the management of a hotel
is unjustly refusing jobs to minority applicants, then others may help
such minority persons to bring pressure on the management to correct
his unjust practice. In this way they compare such sit-ms to the sit-ms
in restaurants and lunch counters, where Negroes were unjustly demed
their right to be served.
There is one important difference between the two cases: the lunch-
counter sit-ms were directly against the alleged injustice while the
other type is against an allegedly unjust man but not directly against
the injustice itself. It is only a form of putting pressure on the manage-
ment to correct evil practices in another matter. The fact that such
demonstrations have been effective does not justify them. Threatening
the owner with a pistol might also be effective. In the judgment of
this theologian writer, such pressure, the physical preventing of the
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carrying on of business, to correct an injustice in some other part of
the business than that of serving customers, is never justified. On the
other hand, means of persuasion, such as a peaceful picket line with
placards or open letters or advertisements in the newspapers pointing
out the mjustices of the management and urging people to avoid
business with hun can be a legitimate form of pressure, provided that
no physical force or threat of force is used and provided further that
the demonstrators are certain of the truth of their accusations. This
type of demonstration would usually be within the law, and should be.
The type of civil disobedience which consists of impeding traffic
or causing other nuisance to the general public is defended by some
of its proponents by a similar line of argumentation as indicated above
for the previous type. The principal difference is that here pressure is
brought to bear on the general public rather than on a particular
manager or owner. They argue that the general public has an obliga-
tion to do something about the given situation and that therefore
pressure may be brought to bear on the general public to correct the
alleged evil. The answer of this theologian writer would be about the
same as above, with the additional comment that it is very difficult
to assess any obligation on the general public to take any decisive
action in most cases. But even if it were certain that the voters of an
area were under obligation to correct a given evil, the means of pres-
suring them should not include interference with their rights nor to
cause them a loss of business or even to cause them mental and emo-
tional suffering.
Further, there would be a dangerous consequence to the arguments
of the proponents of the above two types of pressuring, fatal to the
common good of law and order: since no one is perfect and since there
are always some evils to be corrected, there would always exist reasons
for such demonstrations against almost any employer or against the
public. And here again there are means within the law to try to
persuade the general public to correct public evils.
Some proponents of the latter type of pressuring the public appeal
to the example of Gandhi and hs movement of non-violent resistance
in India. But the case is entirely different even if one concedes that
Gandhi and his followers were justified. Gandhi's actions were against
a government whose exercise of any governmental power in India he
judged substantially unjust. India had become a nation capable of
self-government and so had a right to be free of British domination.
There is not space here to go into the whole question of the condi-
tions under which rebellion might be justified. Obviously Americans
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17
believe that it can be justified at times; but also the vast majority of
Americans believe in the substantial justice of our form of government
and so have a right to resist those who would overthrow the govern-
ment. Any assertion of parity between the right to rebel against
tyranny and an alleged right to civil disobedience as a means to bring
voters to action seems too far-fetched to merit a serious answer other
than pointing out the lack of parity
Application of Principles to Cases
This theologian writer hereby submits his personal judgment of
the application of the above principles to cases publicized in the press,
with the warning note that the cases are judged as presented without
any pretense that he has investigated the cases sufflciently to be certain
of the facts. If the cases were as presented in the papers, this is his
judgment
Lunch-counter sit-ins in the South. Morally justified as against those
who refused to serve Negroes, provided that the sitters were ready
to accept service and pay for it if rendered, and that they were other-
wise orderly and clean according to ordinary accepted custom for such
an eating place. Reason: since a service was being offered to the public,
Negroes had a right to be served. To deny that service merely because
they were Negroes was a violation of a human right. The laws to the
contrary were unjust laws. Theologians would agree on this with
practical unanimity
Selma-Montgomery march. A justified form of expressing dissent
and seeking redress for unjust laws of segregation and unjust practices
of discrimination in voter registration. Legal means were sought: A
public parade without violence on the part of the marchers was
originally prohibited by the Governor, but a court held this prohibition
to be unjust exercise of authority 21
San Francisco sit-ins at Palace Hotel and Cadillac agency and
shop-ms at super-markets. As understood from newspaper reports
these were all demonstrations to correct alleged injustices in hiring
policies and not in service policies. There was effective hurting of
business by physical obstruction rather than mere persuasion. Not
justified even if the demonstrators were certain of the injustice of
hiring procedures. The physical obstruction to business was not a result
of refusal to give a publicly offered service. Furthermore, mere lack of
Negro employees in certain categories is not of itself proof of unjust
21 Wlliams v. Wallace, 240 F Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
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discrimination in hiring. It could be that qualified Negroes had not
applied.
Chicago traffic blocking. As this theologian understood the case
from sketchy reading of newspapers: Demonstrators tied up traffic by
lying down in busy streets, to pressure the public into doing something
about removing an allegedly unjustly inactive superintendent of public
instruction. Unjustified; physical obstruction used against persons not
certainly guilty of wrong, and even if guilty, physical means used
against something not directly involved. It would seem especially
difficult also in such a case to be certain of the cause in the first place,
but if certain, the agitators should have publicized the cause, but not
in such a manner as to cause mental anguish to the public or obstruct
them from their daily business. If they felt some demonstration in the
streets was necessary they should have applied for a permit for a
parade or other show
Furthermore, in this case, there seems no justification for forcing
the police to carry them into the patrol wagons when arrested. If they
felt justified in such a demonstration, they should at least have been
willing to take the consequences of their actions and cooperate with
the arresting police who were only doing their duty 22
Vietnam tram blocking. Not justified. If the demonstrators sincerely
judged the war unjust, they should take legal means to publicize their
position, such as the later march with a parade permit. They should
also realize that the soldiers; engineers and others were doing what
they felt was their conscience obligation. Since they protested against
being sent to a war against their consciences, they should have
respected the consciences of others.
Draft-card burning. Not justified. It is legitimate to register dissent
on war in general by filing notice for classification as a conscientious
objector, or to express dissent with the carrying on of a given war,
but by legal means. The state is within its rights in demanding
registration of available manpower, and has the right to insist on sub-
stitute forms of service for those who have sincere conscientious
objection against bearing arms.
22 Unless they judged that the arrests were unjust. Even then, many who justify'
disobedience to unjust laws advise accepting the consequences of their actions. Martin
Luther King, in his letter from the Birmingham Jail, in. KiNG, WAY WE CAss' WAr
83-84 (1963), stated: "One who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lovingly and
with a willingness to accept the penalty." Compare A Statement by the House of Bishops
to the Church on Christian Obedience, The Episcopalian, Dec. 1964, p. 31; Bayard
Rustin, Director of the War Resistors League, in a statement at the Center for the Study
of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, as cited in The Center Diary, Jan. 1966, p. 9.
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Self-burning. Not justified. Christian theology has for centuries
considered the deliberate killing of oneself to be against the law of
God, even if the motive is a noble one. Some very recent theologians
have questioned this, but not enough to constitute what systematic
moral theologians would consider a solidly probable opimon.
In these last five cases, this theologian judges that the state was
fully justified in taking police action against the violators of the law,
and imposing fines or other penalties.
Summary
Civil disobedience demonstrators often appeal to a "higher law,"
to justify their actions. Theologians of most religious faiths agree that
a higher law, the law of God, will preempt any contrary civil law
because all authority comes from God. Nevertheless, conflicting divine
law is to be proved, not presumed. Divine law is finally known by each
man in the judgment of his conscience. The state cannot know a man's
conscience and therefore is justified in demanding some outside evi-
dence to support the individual's claim.
Just how much of such evidence should be required is difficult
to decide. A pluralistic state should recognize any claim clearly based
on known public teaching of a reputable religious organization not
directly opposed to the entire American way of life and government.
The same principles hold for military and court orders. Morally one
must disobey an order to do an immoral act.
Appeals to conscience by atheists, although not claiming divine
authority, should pr6bably be treated similarly as based on some inner
imperative which theological thought would see as a reflection of
natural divine law
Civil disobedience against admittedly just laws is not considered
justified. Intent to put pressure on those who can and should correct
injustices does not justify the use of illegal means. General civil
disobedience is only justified where rebellion would be ]ustified-only
when it is necessary self-defense against tyranmcal oppression.
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